

that transcends these divisions while keeping in place existing property relations—that, perhaps, is the core vocation of fascism” (*Culture*, p. viii) is as elegant and thought provoking a five pages as I have read in a long while—one that also manages to summarize the major theorists of fascism from Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno on.

Readers of this journal will be especially interested in the essays on everyday aesthetics, which include Aaron Skabelund’s study of the loyal dog Hachiko, immortalized in Japanese and American films (the 2009 *Hachi: A Dog’s Tale* (Hallström), starring Richard Gere), who “played a prominent role in the culture of fascism as experienced in Japan,” and a study of fascists’ plan to make textile factory girls’ dormitories more aesthetic “as a means of increasing industrial productivity for total war” (*Culture*, p. 15) by means of *mingei* (by Kim Brandt). (For a study of a more radical examination of aesthetics in textile factory girls’ lives, see my article on Kishida’s play *Thread Hell*, “Agency, Identity, and Aesthetic Experience in Post-Atomic Japanese Narratives by Kawabata and Rio Kishida and the Film *Barefoot Gen*” in Minh Nguyen’s *New Essays in Japanese Aesthetics* [Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, forthcoming].) Noriko Aso argues that “while Yanagi’s writings have generally been perceived as humanist, often of a romantic cast but with liberal moments, striking similarities exist between his folk-craft discourse and fascist aesthetics of the wartime era. Second, Yanagi’s discursive strategies were organized by a particular consciousness of the importance of the ‘masses’ in the modern world, a group he sought to ‘represent’ in an aesthetic and, broadly speaking, political sense. This form of discursive mediating agency constituted a bridge between a kind of reform-oriented humanism and fascism in the historical context of Japan in the 1930s and 1940s” (*Culture*, p. 139).

#### IV. CONCLUSION

In spite of overlapping essays on two authors (Yanagi and Kawabata), *The Aesthetics* and *The Culture of Japanese Fascism* differ considerably in their compass. Both provide both new insights on familiar work and solid analyses of at least some material that will be new to most readers.

The greatest difficulties in understanding modern Japanese aesthetics stem from the facts that the same aesthetics may be used to either fascist or non-fascist effects, that fascist effects are not always intentional, that so many of the same aesthetics have been used both to support and to undermine fascism—and that they continue into the present day. Readers will both enjoy and learn from these two thought-provoking

and knowledgeable books that render these seeming paradoxes intelligible.

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COCHRANE, TOM, BERNARDINO FANTINI, and KLAUS R. SCHERER, eds. *The Emotional Power of Music: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Musical Arousal, Expression, and Social Control*. Oxford University Press, 2013, x + 381 pp., 22 b&w illustrations, \$99.00 cloth.

The first sentence in the Introduction to this book is, “The field of music and emotion research is burgeoning.” The statement is correct, both with regard to the old and new scientific disciplines increasingly active in this field and to the number of philosophers latching on to the advances. The first sentence on the back cover is, “How can an abstract sequence of sounds so intensely express emotional states?” But pure instrumental, absolute music, dear to formalists, is one of the least concerns of the book. Furthermore, since music is not a sentient being, more accurate phrasing would have been “expressive of”—and this is also telling. Instead, the Hegelian “emotional power of music” in the title is close to an *idée fixe* of most of the contributors, forgetting that, in *Aesthetics*, Hegel’s music-induced grief is “assuaged at once” by music, which suggests a quasi-emotion that would be switched off by someone’s cough or a phone ringing—unlike real-life grief (which was experimentally demonstrated by Konečni, Brown, and Wanic in *Psychology of Music* 36 [2008]: 289–308). The book has no space for the opinions of Hanslick, Hindemith, and Stravinsky, nor for formalists like Kivy and Zangwill, nor for other contemporary skeptics: obeisance to music’s alleged emotional and other powers ignores contemplation, rational enjoyment, and dispassionate analysis completely. Oxford University Press (OUP), a leading publisher of “affective science” (one of the series editors is Klaus Scherer), should be congratulated for publishing this unique, technically complex, multifaceted, and extreme expression of *emotivism* in music (not to be confused with emotivism in ethics), which I have defined elsewhere as a culturological stance that promotes—at the expense of reason and evidence—the insertion of emotion, feeling, and sensitivity into every crevice of human life and behavior, especially in the arts. OUP boldly did this despite publishing a 1000-page compendium on “music and emotion” in 2010.

The book under review is divided into three sections, “Musical expressiveness” (seven chapters),

“Emotion elicitation” (eight), and “The powers of music” (seven). Each is preceded by an introduction from one of the editors. There are twenty-three contributors, of which close to a half have been affiliated with the Swiss National Center for Affective Sciences in Geneva (Scherer was a long-time director). Others are equally from continental Europe and England. There are two essays by U.S.-based scholars (one deceased in 2001, the music historian Claude Palisca). The range of their specialties is impressive and includes philosophy, musicology, psychology, cognitive neuroscience, history of music and medicine, and more. As always, this is a mixed blessing and leads to various conceptual and terminological collisions. That the editors, from three different disciplines, were able to inspire adherence to a single overall point of view by virtually all the contributors means one of two things: a widespread acceptance of the emotivist thesis or a careful selection of contributors. The fact that the book is based on conferences and workshops in Geneva (and one in Durham) testifies to the latter explanation, and it is supported by the total exclusion of naysayers—in contributions, citations, and the index.

There are more contributions than there is space to discuss them. In the section on “Musical expressiveness,” the most significant effort is Scherer’s. Here he applies his previous first-rate contributions, offered within the mainstream psychobiological emotion theory, with an emphasis on appraisal and the synchronicity of systems, to the Diderot–Stanislavski–Brecht question of the stage performer’s approach to a convincing display of a character’s emotions. However, especially with regard to Scherer’s main concern, opera singers’ behavior, he sets up a false dichotomy between a singer’s truly experiencing a protagonist’s emotion and imitating one. The dichotomy has been questioned in numerous articles on “method” acting and “distancing” (*Verfremdung*). But Scherer fortunately includes a summary of interviews with four fine opera singers. Tenor Thomas Moser says: “The emotion in the music has an influence but it’s not ruling me. . . . I know that I have to know what it is that I’m trying to express” (p. 57). All four singers talk of the enormous technical constraints of execution on any “emoting.”

Yet this important issue is not properly acknowledged by either Michael Spitzer or Daniel Leech-Wilkinson in their chapters. Spitzer, a *Lieder* specialist, adequately discusses the expressive devices of Schubert’s “Trockne Blumen” in terms of descriptive musicology, but when he steps out of emotional cruxes and cathartic releases, one finds him misinformed about emotion research and attributing the origination of the concepts of basic emotions to P. N.

Juslin, of mood as a response to music to J. Robinson, and of regression to the mean to D. Huron. Leech-Wilkinson’s untiring attempts to make considerations of music ontology bear on performance rather than the composer and the score continue here unabated. Cochrane’s attempt, in the introduction to this section, to find a tension by contrasting Spitzer’s and Leech-Wilkinson’s views of expressiveness and score versus performance rings hollow: it is obvious to any musician (if not scholar) that both are important. The best composers of all epochs create architectural perfection that moves in time, and the best performers stand in awe. Leech-Wilkinson also plunges into contagion (in a different sense than Stephen Davies) and empathy (along with a 2008 paper in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* by Cochrane on expression and “extended cognition”), but there is a substantial literature critical of their views to which I have contributed.

The first of Cochrane’s two chapters consists of interviews with several notable composers. Their comments, especially Jean-Claude Risset’s and Brian Ferneyhough’s, would have perhaps been more valuable if Cochrane’s questions about the unlimited power of music were less leading and assertive. His second chapter, “On the resistance of the instrument,” is of limited scholarly potential but introduces the “mood organ,” borrowed from science fiction, as the music emotivist’s aural equivalent of “mood rings” from the 1970s. The mood organ is seriously described as a vehicle for “emotion-sharing.” The section concludes with two very interesting music-historical essays by Christine Jeanneret (on gender ambivalence in the performances of cantatas in seventeenth century Rome by castrati and female singers) and (posthumously) by Palisca on the ethos of modes in the Renaissance. Both, among many other issues, speak of music as a totality comprising poetry, drama, and sexual stimuli, but neither speaks of the effect of music *qua* music.

Scherer’s introduction to the eight chapters of the second section, “Emotion elicitation,” half-heartedly challenges the strong claims of emotion induction and overstates the disagreement on this issue across the chapters in the section. In fact there is little, and it is a pity that more fundamental differences are not here represented. Scherer’s own chapter, with Eduardo Coutinho, is ambivalent. The authors never clearly state something very simple and almost certainly true: *some* music *may, sometimes*, in *some* people, under *some* circumstances, elicit *some* psychobiological emotions, but never nearly as powerful as the correspondent emotions in social life. Furthermore, there is, again, the neglected issue of music *qua* music—as opposed to the mediation by

extramusical factors such as the evoked visual images and episodic memories and evaluative conditioning. Scherer and Coutinho broaden the definitions when it is convenient, artificially expand the domain of “affective sciences” (p. 125), and attempt to find support for “aesthetic emotions” in Kant’s notion of aesthetic experience as disinterested pleasure. But these are not obviously closely related concepts.

One may disagree with several aspects of Davies’s idea of music-to-listener “emotional contagion,” but his stands as the most cogent essay in the book. Davies is rare (including other philosophers in the volume, such as Jenefer Robinson) in that he religiously tries to preempt criticism of each of his statements. But he does not solve the basic problem of emotion elicitation and ends up saying that experiencing sadness to sad music is more normal than experiencing joy. Well.

An interesting article is Luca Zoppelli’s on “Mors stupebit” in Verdi’s *Requiem* (which, contrary to the editors’ claims, seems to be a translation of Zoppelli’s 2003 article in the German journal *Musiktheorie*). A simple, but notable, contribution of Zoppelli’s sophisticated piece is his discussion that there have historically existed different listening styles and listening cultures regarding the induction of emotion. But to claim that *Mors stupebit* (at the end of *Tuba mirum*) instills genuine *fear* brings us back to the issue of quasi-emotions.

Joel Krueger’s “Empathy, enaction, and shared musical experience: Evidence from infant cognition” is one of several chapters in the book that have not been subjected to editorial oversight in terms of tentativeness and length. Here one has breastfeeding and lullabies, empathy defined far too broadly, and the shared musical experience of neonates and infants with caregivers being placed in a position far more important than language. (Whom, precisely, does Krueger have in mind as “caregivers” in contemporary England singing lullabies?) There is the obligatory criticism of Steven Pinker, the “music is auditory cheesecake” person, and music emotivism’s foe No. 1, for saying that “compared with language, vision, social reasoning, and physical know-how . . . music appears to be pure pleasure technology, a cocktail of recreational drugs” (p. 178). On the basis of serious child-development literature, one must stand with Pinker. But Krueger’s essay captures the spirit of this book: people do little but emote, most of the time in response to music; this is wonderful, but more would be better. Krueger favors the idea of soothing-music therapy for neonates, which would replace the clanking in their environment. In this music-therapy enthusiasm, Krueger is far from being alone; he joins, for example, the notable English social and developmental (empirical) psychologists Adrian

North and David Hargreaves in *The Social and Applied Psychology of Music* (OUP, 2008) book (my review essay appeared in *Psychology of Music* 37 [2009]: 235–245).

Colling and Thompson contribute a solid paper, “Music, action, and affect,” in a certain cognitive-science tradition: a grandiose pronouncement on music and emotion, followed by a sensible backing-off when it comes to experiments. Then comes the promise that the authors will prove that music, as “the paradigm example of an embodied signal, can be the *direct object* of powerful emotional experience” (p. 197). What this means in the conception and findings of the experiments is that minuscule gestures and facial movements influence evaluations of performance (*not* the listener’s emotional experience). On the theoretical plane, Colling and Thompson follow Leonard Meyer and David Huron in not subjecting to serious critical analysis the idea that genuine emotion can result from violations of musical expectancy: minor inconsequential surprise is objectively more likely.

There are two neuroscientific contributions. One, by Wiebke Trost and Patrik Vuilleumier, on “rhythmic entrainment as a mechanism for emotion induction by music” is largely didactic, highly selective in which experiments to discuss, and unremarkable in its failure to submit widely cited findings, such as those by Blood and Zatorre (2001), to a thorough critical analysis. The simple question regarding this positron emission tomography study would be: why is it that the most (physiological) thrill-producing piece of music for participant X (self-nominated) is used as the *control* stimulus for participant Y, producing no effect (and *expected* not to)? The answer is probably not simply in inter-participant music-taste variability, but in each person’s thrill-inducing bit of music being associated with a particular *extramusical* listening context, such as wine, sex (as in Plato’s Athens), and drugs—an important subject almost completely ignored in the book. This is odd, considering that “music” is treated indiscriminately throughout the book as a vast “stimulus” encompassing song, recitatives, dance (rarely), and all kinds of performance domains. However, the key to understanding the essence of the current music-causes-emotion avalanche will not be found in the madrigals, Bach, the late quartets, Schubert’s *Lieder*, or Verdi, but on p. A8 of the *New York Times International* on July 21, 2014, regarding a music event in Rotterdam: some 10,000 people attended the “Crazy Sexy Cool” outdoor festival, where electronic music fans paid the equivalent of \$35 to dance to the beats of different “acts.” This happened only three days after the July 17 crash of MH17, flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, and carrying 193 Dutch citizens.

Stefan Koelsch's chapter, "Striking a chord in the brain: Neurophysiological correlates of music-evoked positive emotions," is one of the most ambitious ones, but certainly not the strongest. One cannot help noticing the friction between causation and correlation in the very title, admittedly not uncommon in neuroscientific writing and inferences. Koelsch begins by stating that the range of positive "emotions" begins with "fun" and reaches its apex with *frisson* (thrills/chills), in which he uncritically follows the above-mentioned Blood and Zatorre. This is both theoretically and introspectively odd, because thrills have a very brief time course and occur, in many people, relatively frequently, whereas the states of being moved and, especially, (aesthetic) awe, are truly profound and memorable, although the latter, in the case of music, probably requires a majestic and acoustically superb performance setting of, for example, a mediaeval cathedral. Koelsch considers music an "important tool for studying emotion" (p. 227), a methodological approach which rests on several questionable assumptions about both music and emotion. Using X to study Y only to then infer something about X requires enormous experimental finesse and interpretive caution. (See my article "Does music induce emotion? A theoretical and methodological analysis," *Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts* 2 [2008]: 115–129). It is regrettable to have to say that the chapter abounds in unsupported, overreaching claims, selective citing, conceptual and terminological confusion, naïve sociologizing, and occasional circular reasoning, with statements that begin with "everyone knows the experience of music-evoked emotion . . ." (p. 232) and "a particular advantage of music is that it can evoke a range of positive emotions; this makes music a useful tool for investigating neural correlates . . ." (p. 234). But perhaps the most important, although difficult to convey briefly, are the logical discrepancies. On one hand, there is the claim that activity in the ventral striatum (presumably in the nucleus accumbens, NAc, in the basal forebrain) during music listening proves that music causes emotion. On the other, Koelsch states (pp. 236–237) that "in three of the mentioned studies [one of which was his own, with colleagues], participants did not report 'frissons' during music listening, suggesting that dopaminergic pathways including the NAc can be activated by music as soon as it is perceived as pleasant (i.e. even in the absence of extreme emotional experiences involving 'frissons')." What this suggests is that music "experiences" of all sorts of intensity are neurally registered, from just listening to music to *frisson*, so that neural scanning observations cannot be used as a reasonable proof that profound responses to music (far exceeding the *frisson*, such as aesthetic awe) have taken place.

Without meaning to imply disrespect for the first two sections, it is in the third, "miscellaneous," part of the book that scholars interested in music will perhaps find most food for thought. However, to obtain the nourishment, the reader first needs to stomach lots of hyperbole and a neglect of contemplation and of enjoyment of beauty in music for its own sake (for example, in Bernardino Fantini's introduction). This accomplished, there is a fine array of essays by Fantini himself, Laurence Wuidmar, Brenno Boccadoro, Penelope Gouk, and Jackie Pigeaud to be enjoyed. There is no need to emote against the editors-imposed "The powers of music" title of this section, for these essays are a wonderful mix of the history of science, medicine, and law—all related to music in mediaeval, Renaissance, and Enlightenment Europe. Among the occasional blunders and exaggerations of academic striving, one finds rare jewels in these essays, for which the authors and the three editors should be congratulated. The finest essay, perhaps because of its musical touch of poignancy—in addition to being wise, measured, and open-minded—is Jean Starobinski's "On nostalgia." It addresses much more than its austere title discloses. (This chapter and four others in the third section were expertly translated into English by Kristen Gray Jafflin.)

What, in the view of this reviewer, is missing in this ambitious book that would have set it apart from many others on a similar topic? (1) A serious attempt at a genuine vertical theoretical integration from neural correlates to the rare, peak emotion. (2) More concrete information about the routes of emotion induction by music—and to which emotion (if any). At present one has a flood of "might" routes, promoted by Scherer, Koelsch, and Juslin, among others, but nothing based on indisputable research findings. One needs to inquire into where the various "induction routes" originate—is it in sound science or in theorists' introspection (nothing to be ashamed of)? (3) A rational attempt to understand when, how, and whether music-induced emotions occur. In the din created by music-elicits-emotions books, the solitary contemplative music lovers are mostly forgotten, as are their rare but very profound emotional experiences to music. (4) Finding an empirical solution to one of the mysteries of the hedonic trajectory of people's voluntary (and involuntary) *repeated exposure* to a piece of music over sometimes very long units of time. (5) A concerted return of both laboratory and field investigations to the effects of naturalistically induced emotion and mood on listeners' *choice* among music-listening alternatives. (6) An analysis of the possibility of an evolutionary impact of music via *dance* (including sexual selection), by ordinary men and women, in which health, endurance,

coordination, and body symmetry are displayed for all candidates to witness. (7) A serious coming to terms with the fact that, apart from the contemplative music lovers, many effects of “music” on “emotion” occur in the constellation of intoxication and sexual arousal. Plato knew this well.

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SOMMER, DORIS. *The Work of Art in the World: Civic Agency and Public Humanities*. Duke University Press, 2014, 232 pp., 14 b&w illus., \$79.95 cloth.

In *The Work of Art in the World*, Doris Sommer considers the following question: Are the humanities useless? This question has been the subject of extensive debate both inside and outside academia. In the scholarly debate, Martha Nussbaum’s *Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010) is the most notable recent contribution arguing for societies’ urgent need of the humanities. In the “Opinionator” section of *The New York Times*, a diverse set of discussants has been debating humanities’ value(s) and usefulness from different perspectives. Among those, Professor Stanley Fish has written several well-known and controversial pieces, all defending the idea that the humanities are useless. In this book, Sommer contributes to this debate by developing an original “pragmatic defense” (p. 1) of the humanities and their “utility” in contemporary societies. In her view, a humanistic education, with its traditional focus on artistic creativity and interpretation, is essential for acquiring those “intellectual and civic skills” (p. 114) that are instrumental in solving real-life problems within a democratic context.

Sommer’s pragmatic defense focuses on selected socially engaged art projects. Many of the projects discussed in her book were developed within the context of a multidisciplinary program that Sommer founded at Harvard, *Cultural Agents: Arts and Humanities in Civic Engagement* (<http://www.culturalagents.org/>). Since the late 1990s, this program has been building networks between academics, artists, and organizations promoting the use of arts-based project as strategies for solving real-life problems. Through an interesting mix of qualitative and quantitative strategies, Sommer analyzes the positive economic, social, and political impact that those projects have had on the lives of their targeted audiences. Sommer uses those projects’ positive impact as evidence in favor of her theoretical account of the “utility” of

arts and humanities. Such an account rejects the views of those who are skeptical about art’s civic possibilities. Sommer’s critical target is not limited to the philistine, but also includes the “pessimistic” (p. 6) academic and, surprisingly enough, the intellectual whose purpose is “protest” (p. 93).

The positive side of Sommer’s account argues for the central role that aesthetic experience plays in developing free thinking. It also proposes a genealogy of what one can call optimism about the arts’ civic possibilities. In other words, it traces the conceptual roots of the view that “creativity and aesthetic judgment are foundations for democracy” (p. 8) and public life. Starting with Friedrich Schiller, the genealogy encompasses a heterogeneous set of thinkers such as Walter Benjamin, John Dewey, Paolo Freire, Antonio Gramsci, Jürgen Habermas, Melanie Klein, Maria Montessori, Jacques Rancière, and Donald Winnicott.

Chapters 1 and 2 explore in detail the socially engaged projects that Sommer uses as evidence in favor of her view. These chapters constitute the most convincing part of the book. Their merit is twofold. First, they bring attention to interesting artistic projects developed outside the boundaries of the museum or the art gallery. Socially engaged art projects in the public domain are an important aspect of our artistic practices and surely “merit a more sustained reflection than they have gotten” (p. 3). Second, these chapters show how discussions of art and its impact on society can be fruitfully informed with insights from the social sciences. For their interdisciplinary nature, these chapters would appeal to many readers, including, among others, those with an interest in aesthetics and philosophy of art, art history and criticism, sociology of art, education, and public policy.

Chapter 1 discusses “top down” (p. 12) projects of socially engaged art. Envisioned “by high-ranking” political leaders, these projects show how governments and public institutions can profit from the arts’ civic possibilities. While discussing programs developed by Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama and American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, among others, the chapter emphasizes the initiatives of Antanas Mockus, who was mayor of Bogotá. Before Mockus’s election in 1994, the capital of Colombia was the most dangerous city in Latin America. Widespread corruption made it virtually impossible to mitigate violence through “conventional cures of money and more armed enforcement” (p. 16). In response, Mockus utilized unconventional strategies to address the conditions of social and political paralysis. He did this by sponsoring various works of “relational art” (p. 27), whose respective aims were to tackle specific issues afflicting the city and its inhabitants. Functioning as catalysts for social interaction, relational artworks are designed to generate